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The semiotics of the theater of cruelty 
IRIS SMITH 
Introduction 
"Toute I'ecriture est de la cochonnerie" With these few words Antonin 
Artaud (1896-1948) thrusts us abruptly into the realm he calls the Theater 
of Cruelty. This uncompromising judgment against the value of writing 
summarizes Artaud's struggle to replace the linguistic sign with a surreal, 
'concrete' sign, to eliminate 'masterpieces' in favor of a type of writing 
and a theater that would live in the present, not the past. Moreover, in the 
word 4cochonnerie', suggestive of the elemental functions of the body, 
Artaud signals his obsession with a mind/body split. Much of his work 
seeks to heal that split and to achieve a seamless, surreal purity that will 
incorporate both the physical and the spiritual. Artaud's attack on 
writing, that merely cerebral activity, lies at the base of his reformulation 
of the theater. As a canonized work, the masterpiece has lost its spark, its 
connection with a 'sur-reality' which is difficult enough to perceive, but 
impossible by Artaud's standards to represent on the stage with a petrified 
pattern of words. Performances in which a written text predominates have 
no capacity to join sign with object. Instead, they produce mere meta-
phor, or even worse. A new forum, wherein sign and object face each 
other directly, was Artaud's lifelong goal; his closest approximation may 
have been his idea of the Theater of Cruelty. 
After linking writing with filth or rubbish, Artaud goes on to say: LLes 
gens qui s or tent du vague pour essay er de preciser quoi que ce so it de ce qui 
se passe dans leur pensee, sont des cochons' (Artaud 1956: Vol. 1, 95). In 
other words, do not strive for precise thought in the arts, for in its 
connection to the merely rational, logic does not allow for the surreal. 
Artaud considers vagueness and contradiction to be an integral part of 
reality, and certainly not to be expunged from any true representation of 
it, whether in written or theatrical form. We may wonder, in fact, what 
such a lover of paradox and mysticism might have in common with a 
logician such as Charles Peirce, or how the two might find common 
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ground on which to communicate. Peirce in many ways stands for the 
advocacy of 'masterpieces' that Artaud rejects so vehemently. And, in 
turn, we do not need Peircp's division of the sign relation into interpre-
tant-sign-object to recognize that Artaud's notion of the 'concrete sign', 
which he thought of as a cathartic union collapsing the relations of thing 
representing and thing represented, is an impossible, pseudo-platonic 
conflation that refuses to deal with the question of consensus and 
spectator competence. Interpretation does not, should not, and will not 
exist in the Theater of Cruelty, Artaud implies, for there will be no 
distance between sign and object in which to misinterpret. Nor does there 
seem to be any room here (misinterpretation aside) for the interpretant, 
for the sign exhibits the object, says Artaud, in all its fullness real and 
surreal, in the theater space. In what way, then, might Peirce be useful to 
us? 
I think we must remember that it is very easy, and very dangerous, to be 
enticed into considering Artaud's theories solely on his own terms. As a 
student of ritual, the Cabbala, tarot, and theories of alchemy, Artaud 
encourages his readers to follow those same paths with him. It is necessary 
for Artaud's critics to make use of these tools in understanding such 
works as 'Les nouvelles revelations de l'etre' (based on the tarot) or 'Le 
theatre alchimique'. But any one of these texts can quickly become 
prescriptive in its insistence on the absolute magic of the word (one 
sign/one meaning), and the critic's perspective on the lifelong struggle in 
which that work was written may be lost. In the subtleties of this struggle 
we begin to find material that semiotics might find interesting, or even 
compelling. To the issues of the activity/passivity of the sign; of what 
constitutes materiality; of which perceptions are mediated and which 
might be termed immediate — to these issues Peirce can add interesting 
insights, usually drawn from his division of experience into triads. As we 
shall see, Artaud's life was dominated by his struggle against duality, a 
gnostic structuring of existence that he could never seem to elude. Peirce's 
triads allow us to reformulate some of Artaud's questions in interesting 
new ways; and, amazingly enough, they allow us to observe some 
remarkable similarities of mind between the mystic and the logician. 
Somewhere in the middle ground between so-called 'absolute' mysticism 
and 'absolute' rationality, Peirce and Artaud have both tramped and 
pondered, perhaps seldom agreeing on how the questions should be asked 
but — oddly enough — sometimes coming to similar conclusions. 
Before I pursue this argument further, I would like to provide a brief 
introduction to a few of Artaud's ideas which will be most relevant here. 
In terming the masterpiece a 'destructive' way of viewing the arts, we have 
opened the door to Artaud's thorough-going critique of his society, one 
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which he defined in terms of the written text; of the mind abstracted into 
self-torture and the body fallen into self-consuming sexuality. Tying these 
together was his horror of derivation. We must recognize that Peirce and 
Artaud had totally different ideas of what constitutes nature or natural 
processes. Peirce treats the semioses of human experience as part of the 
larger, natural process of semiosis; Artaud, however, set man in direct 
opposition to nature. He criticized man for withholding himself from the 
sources of life and for opposing his rational, abstract will to the concrete 
deterministic 'forces' which could once again restore man to life, if he 
cultivated the proper physical and mental states. The Theater of Cruelty 
was one of Artaud's attempts to purge man of his abstraction and return 
the two halves of his being to one. It is this archetypal or perhaps Jungian 
vision of unity with the subconscious that leads him to establish the 
'concrete sign' as the cornerstone of his theater and nature as an ideal to 
be achieved, not a reality to be analyzed. 
While the French commentators recognize this Artaud of the theater, 
they are influenced much more greatly these days by Artaud's cult of the 
personal. That is to say, his obsession with his own physical and mental 
states and the metaphysical implications which he drew from his own 
experience. Most often this obsession is discussed, both by Artaud and his 
critics, as a separation from himself: a split within his own personality 
with the line drawn between his rational faculties and the real identity he 
felt he should assume. Or, to put it another way, the split caused by 
rationality, i.e., a split between the way rationality represents phenomena 
and what they 'really' are. Unfortunately this terminology is often not 
very clear or helpful. Nor can this explication of Artaud's continuing 
struggle with a body/mind split really deal with the interwoven dualities 
that flower in Artaud's later poetry. Other critics, notably Jacques 
Derrida, have avoided a simplistic formulation by discussing Artaud in 
terms of birth and death, origin and derivation, and 'la parole soufflee' — 
the expired word — which is what the word becomes in the Theater of 
Cruelty: a verbal gesture, as concrete as any of the other 'gestures' made 
in the theater space. As Derrida says, I'ecrit becomes le cri (Derrida 1965: 
62). I will come back to the question of birth and death, materiality/spiri-
tuality, and Derrida's important analyses (deconstructions?) of ' la parole 
souffle e\ once I have given a better sense of what Artaud means by the 
meeting of the object with the sign in the theater, or — to put it in his 
terms — when the principles of reality emerge and present themselves to 
us through the barriers we manage to throw up with our rationality, and 
with rationality's inevitable other ego, our self-consuming obsession with 
the body. 
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The theater and the plague 
In the opening essay of Le Theatre et son double, Artaud makes a startling 
association between the theater and the plague. According to a notation 
in municipal records, in 1720 a vessel called the Grand-Saint-Antoine 
attempts to land at Sardinia. Instead of welcoming the vessel with 
standard courtesy, the viceroy of Sardinia orders the ship away in no 
uncertain terms. His order is considered insane, incomprehensible until it 
is learned that upon reaching Marseilles, some days later, the Grand-
Saint-Antoine becomes responsible for a fresh and particularly virulent 
outbreak of the plague. Why does Artaud consider this story interesting? 
Only because, according to this account, recorded into the archives of the 
town of Cagliari, the term 'contagion' takes on a whole new meaning: 
Cette peste, qui semble reactiver un virus, etait capable toute seule d'exercer des 
ravages sensiblement egaux; puisque de tout l'equipage, le capitaine fut le seul a ne 
pas attraper la peste, et d'autre part, il ne semble pas que les pestiferes nouveau 
venus aient jamais ete en contact direct avec les autres, parques dans des quartiers 
fermes. Le Grand-Saint-Antoine qui passe a une portee de voix de Cagliari, en 
Sardaigne, n'y depose point la peste, mais le vice-roi en recueille en reve certaines 
emanations; car on ne peut nier qu'entre la peste et lui ne se soit etablie une 
communication ponderable, quoique subtile, et il est trop facile d'accuser dans la 
communication d'une maladie pareille, la contagion par simple contact. (Artaud 
1956: Vol. 4, 21) 
Prior to the sighting of the vessel, the viceroy has had a dream in which he 
sees himself and all his kingdom infected by the plague; as a consequence, 
he awakens with the knowledge that his realm is in the gravest danger and 
that he knows how to prevent disaster. The viceroy has not seen the ship 
itself in his dream; yet, the plague has communicated so well that he has 
no doubt upon seeing the Grand-Saint-Antoine that the ship must never 
land. 
Artaud then goes on to describe the effects of the plague on the human 
body, transmuting live, healthy organs into hardened, swollen ones — 
disfigured but intact, with no loss of matter. With no diminution of 
material, the disease almost seems to kill by abstraction or by alchemical 
transformation; this same sort of transmutation afflicts the actor who, 
without being killed or physically altered in any apparent way, is 
penetrated by feelings which do not really belong to him. Similarly, the 
theater has the power to alter the minds of the spectators, with no 
physical change in them. Artaud's point here is that the plague (and the 
theater) is as much a spiritual entity as a material one; it is not enough to 
isolate the microbes which are claimed to spread the disease from one 
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person to the next. For the plague, says Artaud, is a social disaster so far-
reaching and so capable of the absurd that all standards of normality are 
set on their heads: the captain of the vessel does not contract the disease, 
though he had little chance of avoiding it; the viceroy is 'infected' without 
being in the presence of any microbe — in fact, the plague has manifested 
to him its psychic identity, a contagion that might better be described as 
communication. 
At this point it might be instructive to note that Artaud, in completely 
different terms, has made the same phenomenological move that Peirce 
makes, namely, that that which signifies need not be sense-perceptible. 
Phenomena which we perceive in a dreaming or hallucinatory state may 
still be called phenomena, existing because, however they are perceived by 
us, they are demonstrating their capacity to represent something to us. 
Artaud says: 
La peste prend des images qui dorment, un desordre latent et les pousse tout a 
coup jusqu'aux gestes les plus extremes; et le theatre lui aussi prend des gestes et 
les pousse a bout: comme la peste il refait la chaine entre ce qui est et ce qui n'est 
pas, entre la virtualite du possible et ce qui existe dans la nature materialisee. II 
retrouve la notion des figures et des symboles-types, qui agissent comme des coups 
de silence, des points d'orgue, des arrets de sang, des appels d'humeur, des 
poussees inflammatories d'images dans nos tetes brusquement reveillees; tous les 
conflits qui dorment en nous, il nous les restitue avec leurs forces et il donne a ces 
forces des noms que nous saluons comme des symboles: et voici qu'a lieu devant 
nous une bataille de symboles, rues les uns contre les autres dans un impossible 
pietinement; car il ne peut y avoir theatre qu'a partir du moment ou commence 
reellement l'impossible et ou la poesie qui se passe sur la scene alimente et 
surchauffe des symboles realises. 
Ces symboles qui sont le signe de forces mures, mais jusque-la tenues en 
servitude, en inutilisables dans la realite, eclatent sous F aspect d'images incroy-
ables qui donnent droit de cite et d'existence a des actes hostiles par nature a la vie 
des societes. (Artaud 1956: Vol. 4, 34) 
We have certainly come a long way from the notion of the theater as the 
acting-out of a dramatic text. The images and symbols that Artaud speaks 
of here have little to do with literary images and symbols (unless we attach 
the latter term to the ideas of the Symbolists of the late nineteenth 
century), but they have a great deal to do with what Peirce called icons 
and iconic signs.1 As we shall see later, these are the only signs, according 
to Peirce, which can be considered indistinguishable in some way from 
their objects. Of course, Peirce's definition of the iconic would make it a 
term appTicaSTe to both Artaud's notion of theater and a more traditional 
theater, say that of Racine or Shakespeare, in which iconic signs certainly 
are present, but may not dominate the experience to the same extent and 
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in the same manner that they do in the Theater of Cruelty. Artaud's 
'symbols' are signs which have the harrowing and impossible task of 
bringing into the presence of the spectator certain powers that are 
otherwise unavailable to him. We may extract another similarity between 
the operation of the sign in Peirce's system and the function of what I call 
Artaud's 'concrete sign'. In his essay, Artaud makes the point that the 
plague was not introduced to Marseilles by the Grand-Saint-Antoine; in fact, 
the plague was all around, but at that time it was not exercising its full 
powers upon the populace. With the arrival of the vessel, however, the 
powers of the 'original virus' are felt — that is, the virus exerted itself upon 
its victims in a very active manner. In this same way, the signs in the Theater 
of Cruelty impress themselves upon the spectator. The spectator's role is 
more one of receptor and initiate: 'The theater restores us all our dormant 
conflicts and all their powers, and gives these powers names we hail as 
symbols,' to reiterate a sentence from the previous quotation (Artaud 1958: 
27). Artaud would be quick to point out that when he speaks of conflicts 
within the spectators or of archetypes he is not pointing to the spectator as 
the receptacle of the object. A sign in the theater space does not act in some 
psychoanalytical fashion, revealing with a word here or a gesture there 
something within the spectator that he had not recognized before. That is 
to say, Artaud is not engaged in a therapy that identifies all specters as 
'figments of the imagination' and that proceeds to reduce them to their 
owners' constituent neuroses and psychoses. Artaud does use the term 
'repression' but he gives it a distinctly non-Freudian cast. This theater 
instead purifies the spectator by acting on the latent 'cruelty' within him, 
by penetrating him. He may recognize the sign, but he does not create it. In 
a substantial sense, this is a semiotic viewpoint. The way in which the sign 
acts of its own volition, transmitting itself to us and inviting us to 
experience it, bears some relation to Peirce's explanations of the roles of 
sign and interpretant. Because the sign generates the interpretants, its role 
is equally, or more, active than that of the interpreter (if present). Certainly, 
interpretation is not defined by Peirce as a mind actively shaping the world 
around him; rather, it involves receptivity as much as it involves activity, 
and that activity is largely the repositioning that the interpreter engages in 
to explore the widest possible range of interpretants. If we allow that by 
'interpreters' Peirce might mean not only various individuals but one 
individual at various times, we will find his comments on the final 
interpretant to be relevant here. In his correspondence with Lady Welby 
Peirce writes: 
The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is 
destined to come if the sign is sufficiently considered [my italics]. The Immediate 
The semiotics of the theater of cruelty 297 
Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpre-
tant is a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual 
tends. (Peirce 1977: 111) 
A gnostic materiality and the iconic sign 
'Le Theatre et la peste' paints a very idealized portrait of the roles of sign 
and interpreter, one in which not only the final interpretant but the object 
is definitely achieved. Does the interpretant in anything but its 'final' form 
have any meaning for Artaud? I think it does, and we find hints of that 
meaning in other essays and poems in which Artaud speaks of the 
difficulties which must be overcome to create a truthful art. Unfortu-
nately, a more extended discussion of the interpretant is not possible here. 
Dealing, as we are, with an outlook that splits mind from body so 
radically, we would profit more by continuing our examination of the 
sign/object relation. Susan Sontag, in one of the best commentaries in 
English on Artaud, notes that he saw the creation of art not as 
contemplation but as activity, a passion of the mind. And Artaud insists 
on a definition of mind that reflects an impossible duality — of mind as 
body, and body as mind. Sontag comments: 
Against all hierarchical, or Platonizing, theories of mind, which make one part of 
consciousness superior to another part, Artaud upholds the democracy of mental 
claims, the right of every level, tendency, and quality of the mind to be heard. [...] 
The quality of one's consciousness is Artaud's final standard. He unfailingly 
attaches his utopianism of consciousness to a psychological materialism: the 
absolute mind is also absolutely carnal. Thus, his intellectual distress is at the 
same time the most acute physical distress, and each statement he makes about his 
consciousness is also a statement about his body. [...] In his struggle against all 
hierarchical or merely dualistic notions of consciousness, Artaud constantly treats 
his mind as if it were a kind of body — a body that he could not 'possess', because 
it was either too virginal or too defiled, and also a mystical body by whose 
disorder he was 'possessed'.2 (Sontag 1976: xxiii-xxiv) 
Moreover, says Sontag, body itself has a mind that Artaud cannot 
tolerate — namely, all of the physical appetites that are ignorant of the 
'mystical body' and defile it. This is the body that stands in Artaud's way, 
as he searches for a state of grace that will resolve all dualities. Sontag 
explicates these questions in terms of gnostic thought, to which Artaud's 
dualities owe a great deal. Incorporated in each human being is a 
microcosm of the struggle between the demonic forces, incarnated in 
matter, particularly the body, and the divine forces which have vacated 
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the carnal, leaving the human spirit abandoned and trapped in that body. 
Grace and freedom can only be achieved by tapping into the dark powers 
that control the world of matter; hence, Artaud tries to turn theater into a 
gnostic rite, investigates the tarot, travels to Mexico in search of the 
peyote ritual of the Tarahumaras Indians. Freedom, oddly enough, lies in 
an absolute adherence to the proper formulae that will triumph over the 
demonic (and, as we shall see later, here lies the connection between the 
rejection of matter and the rejection of literary language, for the latter has 
no incantatory power and constitutes a mere mindless wandering in the 
desert of the material). The individual, to be set free, submits himself to 
the will of these demons and through his suffering (whether by abstention 
from the pleasures of the flesh or by immersing himself in them) reaches a 
realm beyond good and evil. In this state of grace, mind recovers its 
mystical body, and the physical body no longer constitutes an obstacle. 
Interpreting Artaud's works, particularly his later ones, in terms of 
Gnosticism makes sense, when one understands the extent to which his 
life was hemmed in by these fears of being trapped in a world of matter. 
Images of birth and death, eating and defecating dominate his poetry; 
each poem seems designed to summon the demonic forces in order to 
exorcise them, to release Artaud from his being and allow him to give 
himself birth. Artaud's new being will have no organs, that is, no parts 
with which to divide the body and force it into carnal activity: instead, it 
will be pure and whole, seamless and self-created. In Tour en finir avec le 
jugement de Dieu' he announces: 
L'homme est malade parce qu'il est mal construit. 
II faut se decider a le mettre a nu pour lui gratter cet 
animalcule qui le demange mortellement, 
dieu, 
et avec dieu 
ses organes.... 
Lorsque vous lui aurez fait un corps sans organes, 
alors vous l'aurez delivre de tous ses automatismes et rendu 
a sa veritable liberte. (Artaud 1956: Vol. 13, 104) 
God, particularly Christ, is associated with death and with death's 
accomplice, derivation. In keeping with the contradictions of gnostic 
thought, Artaud both excoriates Christ and claims to be Christ, some-
times in the same breath. As the Redeemer, he will institute a new age; as 
the crucified man, he will earn that redemption with his sufferings. But at 
the same time, Artaud cannot accept the rest of Christ's identity, 
particularly that of son. At times he would deny his real parentage as well, 
in an attempt to escape the death of being trapped in the body, by refusing 
to acknowledge that he is a being derived from others — not the source of 
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life at all, but an extraction from life. Artaud wanted to live at the center 
of a universe that contained only one being: himself. 
Given the discussion of the theater and the plague above, it is easy to 
see how these fears and desires prompted Artaud's obsession for immedi-
acy in the theatrical event. 'Immediate perception' is a tricky question, as 
Ransdell (1979Jpomts~out. However, it seems likely that semiotics allows 
for some form of immediacy, based on capabilities of the icon. Ransdell 
quotes from the Collected Papers (3.362): 
Icons [that is, iconic signs] are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly 
to be distinguished from them. [...] [I]n contemplating a painting, there is a 
moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of 
the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream — not any 
particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an 
icon. (Ransdell 1979: 58) 
I find it amazing that Peirce refers to that moment as a 'pure dream', a 
term which might have come from the pen of Artaud. The images and 
language of the Theater of Cruelty were to have the power of their 
counterparts in a dream. However, Ransdell also notes that we must be 
careful to distinguish these iconic signs from the icon which, as a sign by 
Firstness, cannot be a material object, or even an idea, because its identity 
with the object is a formal one. That is not to say that the icon limits the 
identity of the object to its form, but that it and the object are 
indistinguishable from one another only in that way. Iconic signs have an 
even smaller area of identity with the object, because they are in 
themselves individual objects some form or character of which is func-
tioning iconically. It seems likely, then, given these interpretations, that 
Peirce would try to bring to Artaud's attention that he is creating in the 
Theater of Cruelty, not icons, but iconic signs. The only successful sense 
in which Artaud might use icons is in a theoretical sense, which we find in 
his polemics and manifestoes on the theater. In calling for a Theater of 
Cruelty, Artaud manages to create the signs which he believes can only be 
created in the theater. (Hence, it is not surprising that his written 
metaphors often carry a more vivid and workable sense of the iconic than 
did his work on the stage.) But to say that written language can carry a 
sense of the iconic which Artaud has reserved for a specifically nonliterary 
experience is to say that 'immediate perception' is a much broader term 
than Artaud intended. In fact, Ransdell follows Peirce in suggesting that 
all perception is mediated, and that only the media used will vary. Instead 
he offers the terms 'direct' and 'indirect' perception and 'self-representa-
tion'/'other-representation' to supply a better sense of the range of 
possible iconic signs. Self-representation probably corresponds best to 
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Artaud's definition of the sign-relation, but that designation in no way 
allows the 'purity' of self-representation that Artaud demands. 
Artaud's sense of the 'purity' of the relationship is based on an 
imagined platonic hierarchy which assumes 'object' to be always more 
complete, more real than 'sign' and hence automatically inclusive of it. 
For Peirce, such a hierarchy misrepresents the fluidity and mutuality of 
semiotic relations. Dependent on how the elements of the relationship are 
formed or considered, an iconic sign may have additional iconic charac-
teristics that link it to that or other objects. Or the sign may be connected 
to these objects indexically or symbolically. Even so exact a relationship 
as that of icon and object does not eliminate a multiplicity of other 
possible relations: a photograph of a young girl can refer us not only to 
that particular girl, but also to her twin sister. That the photo is 
considered iconic of the one does not prevent it from being iconic of the 
other. An actor, such as Artaud in the role of Count Cenci, might elicit in 
the course of his performance such an uncanny sense of cruaute that for a 
moment 'we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction 
of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure 
dream'. But that this correspondence can be made does not prevent other 
legitimate iconic relations which may or may not become apparent to 
members of the audience. In this manner, Peirce allows for and deals with 
the questions of interpretation and mediation, although he refuses, for 
very good reasons, to phrase the multiplicity of semiotic relations in those 
terms. Mediation lies in any number of hidden places, not only in how the 
spectator receives the sign, but how the sign might relate, for example, to 
the Dynamical Object through the Immediate Object. While reaching for 
the 'fullness' of the sign in the theater space, Artaud has actually 
impoverished it by trying to eliminate mediation as much as possible. 
However, Artaud did acknowledge, in an indirect fashion, that percep-
tion can be successfully mediated. In searching for the most effective 
medium for his ideas, Artaud seems to have considered seriously film and 
poetry, as well as the theater. Poetry he claimed to have rejected, but 
never actually abandoned. Film fascinated Artaud (he appeared in a 
number of films, most notably several directed by Abel Gance), but he did 
not have the means or opportunity to create his own. As a densely 
mediated experience, film, one would think, would lack a certain physical-
ity (the confrontation between actor and spectator, for example, which 
avant-garde theater often uses as its distinguishing mark). Yet, Artaud 
incorporated certain types of technology into his production of Les Cenci 
(recorded sound and a prototype of the 'moog synthesizer' are the best 
instances) that he felt in no way interfered with the 'directness' of the 
spectator's perception. Once the sound was present 'in the theater space' it 
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could function as effectively as the original sound itself. So, insofar as we 
are speaking of the relationship between spectator and sign, Peirce and 
Artaud seem to agree that the sign can effectively substitute itself for the 
object without losing its (the sign's) own material and individual identity. 
Artaud Knows very well that the existence of the iconic sign is 
predicated by its Secondness, that is, its material or individual identity. In 
terms of theater, we might think immediately of the presence of the actor 
on stage, which we could consider as an index of that actor's off-stage 
existence. The filmic presence of the actor could work similarly, of course. 
Moreover, a 'cruel' performance, like any historical play, functions 
indexically as a whole because of its relation by cause and effect to the 
actual events from which the play was derived. I have often been puzzled, 
in reading Artaud's essays, at his insistence that the Theater of Cruelty 
must draw upon public events in a most particular way. Despite his 
surrealist assumptions that the artist must remain true only to the 
surreality of events, not to a historical accuracy, Artaud's projects for the 
theater were to be adapted from accounts inscribed in government 
records (witness his story of the plague) or from literary texts based on 
historical events, such as Shelley's The Cenci, which provided the bulk of 
the material for Artaud's only full-length play. (We will leave aside the 
irony of his aspirations to adapt any number of plays — masterpieces, 
heaven forbid! — from Calderon's Life Is a Dream to John Ford's 'Tis 
Pity She's a Whore, although reliance on texts certainly did not corre-
spond to his own aspirations to complete originality.) Artaud felt that the 
success of a performance was intimately bound to its genesis in the 
material world, that is, to the event's original occurrence. 
It is this sort of half-buried evidence that leads me to believe there is 
indeed a 'semiotics' of the Theater of Cruelty that shares certain attitudes 
and tenets with Peirce's theories. Certainly one cannot interpret all of 
Artaud's ideas semiotically, since it is apparent that his sense of the 
semiotic usually played servant to other, more-or-less psychologistically 
framed questions. But in the following section, I hope it will become clear 
that even so compatible a commentator as Jacques Derrida is blind to 
aspects that are rather easy to explain in Peircean terms. 
Language as incantation 
In 'Le Theatre de la cruaute et la cloture de la representation' Derrida 
defines the function of speech and writing in the Theater of Cruelty. First 
of all, he notes that Artaud does not distinguish between the two: as 
derivative forms, as representations of a creator who must be eliminated 
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from the theater, speech and writing (logos) contribute to the theological 
(his term) nature of the stage. But they should not be eliminated 
altogether; rather, '[t]hey will once more become gestures; and the logical 
and discursive intentions which speech ordinarily uses in order to ensure 
its rational transparency, and in order to purloin its body in the direction 
of meaning, will be reduced or subordinated' (Derrida 1978: 11). Words 
have concealed themselves by their 'rational transparency': that is, they 
have been treated solely as symbols, with their iconic and indexical 
characteristics neglected, or even deliberately concealed. The sign should 
be streamlined to its iconic form. Derrida continues: 
We know what value Artaud attributed to what is called — in the present case, 
quite incorrectly — onomatopoeia. Glassopoeia, which is neither an imitative 
language nor a creation of names, takes us back to the borderline of the moment 
when the word has not yet been born, when articulation is no longer a shout but 
not yet discourse, when repetition is almost impossible, and along with it, 
language in general: the separation of concept and sound, of signified and 
signifier, of the pneumatical and the grammatical, the freedom of translation and 
tradition, the movement of interpretation, the difference between soul and the 
body, the master and the slave, God and man, author and actor. (1978: 11) 
Derrida's analysis of Artaud's ideas is characterized not only by his taste 
for paradox and dualities (a taste perhaps acquired in part from Artaud) 
but also by his contention, often repeated, that marginality is one of the 
key issues for the contemporary artist and critic. He would like to place 
language on the edge of comprehensibility, where it will reveal its 
sonority, intonation, intensity — the shout that the articulations of language and 
logic have not yet entirely frozen, that is, the aspect of oppressed gesture which 
remains in all speech, the unique and irreplaceable' movement which the generali-
ties of concept and repetition have never finished rejecting. (1978: 11) 
Hence, gesture and speech are/are not separate entities in the Theater of 
Cruelty, says Derrida. It is not enough to say that the linguistic sign 
shares iconic characteristics with nonlinguistic signs created in the stage 
space (e.g., a particular kind of lighting or movement), while assisting in 
presenting a symbolic side as well. The characteristics of the sign must not 
be distinguishable from one another; only if they form a 'clamor [which] 
has not yet been pacified into words', their immediacy will permeate the 
spectator. Derrida would seem to be saying that the linguistic sign 
becomes an entity which can represent in only one way: once again, self-
representation. 
Although I understand how Derrida has extrapolated from the ideas of 
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Artaud, I wonder if his commentary does full justice to the semiotic 
aspects of those ideas. By assuming that a sign only signifies in one 
manner at any one time, he can divide 'gestural' language from 'discur-
sive' language, as though the two were completely independent of one 
another. Moreover, Derrida's analysis of the question of the linguistic 
sign perpetuates an unfortunate formulation of the capabilities of that 
sign: namely, that only in its iconic aspects can the sign be considered 
open, accessible, flexible. Derrida turns at the end of his article to the 
issue of play, the evanescent and self-contradictory appearances of the 
sign when it is pushed to the limits of its iconic qualities ('its sonority, 
intonation, intensity'). In the Theater of Cruelty, says Derrida, the sign 
flirts with its own identity. It stays alive by refusing a Creator, i.e., by 
emerging in the space/time of the performance itself, rather than being the 
excrescence of a literary text, bound to certain rational meanings and 
hence truncating the sign's ability to reach into and represent in any way 
the forces of Cruelty. As a translation of a written sign, the verbal sign 
cannot truly communicate (that is, bring the spectator into the presence of 
the real); it can only repeat and derive, and in so doing the sign dies. 
The misfortune of Derrida's formulation (as it applies to Artaud) does 
not lie in his division of the sign's iconic capacities from its indexical and 
symbolic ones. As I have already noted, Artaud maintains this division 
himself. My complaint with both Derrida and Artaud has more to do with 
their notion that a linguistic sign, derived from a written text, has been 
'frozen', i.e., that its signifying capacities are somehow stunted. If, in a 
production of Hamlet, the actor recites that old favorite, the speech 
beginning 'To be or not to be ...', must the experience be dessicated by the 
fact that it is derived from a 'classic' and that we may have heard and read 
this speech before? How does familiarity in itself really cramp the linguistic 
sign's power to signify, particularly in an iconic fashion? And more than 
that: why are these signs 'frozen' into one set of meanings, while speech in 
the Theater of Cruelty is assumed to be somehow freer, more generous in its 
possibilities for interpretation? Why, in the case of Hamlet, is the sign more 
tied to its creator (and hence less 'playful') than the sign in the Theater of 
Cruelty, which also has its creators, namely, the director, actors, perhaps 
even a rough text. In Peirce's view, the sign has its iconic, indexical, and 
symbolic relations to the object, whether or not it has an author in the 
literary sense of that word, and I do not think Peirce would distinguish 
between 'authored' signs as more or less iconic than 'non-authored' ones. 
(Obviously a more complicated problem of intentionality is implicit here, 
but I think it would be more appropriately discussed in another study.) 
Now Artaud might say that 'non-authored' signs are in fact more iconic 
than symbolic by virtue of the fact that it is society which emphasizes the 
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symbolic side, abstracting and deriving in society's usual way, and 
distancing itself as a result from the object. Artaud, we might say, considers 
the symbolic to be a matter of convention, of structures inveriteH and 
perpetuated by men alone, and hence not 'real'. Once men have agreed on 
certain conventions, there is no give in the system, the meanings are, as 
Derrida says, 'frozen'. This is not to say that they are unchangeable but that 
they can only move within the structure of convention. In Artaud's eyes the 
symbol seems to be entirely a matter of mediation between the spectator 
and a sign and has no access to the object at all. 
While this interpretation of the function of linguistic signs is widely 
accepted today in literary circles, Peirce disagrees. Our understanding of 
Hamlet's speech may be guided in part by convention, but Peirce would 
maintain, I think, that the general uniformity of our response to this speech 
(e.g., that it is well-written, moving, truthful, whatever) has to do with the 
way in which these qualities inhere in the text itself. (This would also apply 
to the way in which the speech has been presented, the setting, lighting, 
choice of actor, and so forth.) Of course Peirce does not come to this 
conclusion by means of survey or statistics; rather, he has come to it 
logically, via the categories which he established on the basis of observation 
and experience and by extrapolation from these and other basic concep-
tions. It is difficult to resist the temptation to say in contradiction: surveys 
of audiences who have attended the play Hamlet show us that, in fact, there 
is a great deal of variation in their response to the play. X culture thinks the 
'to be or not to be' speech is quite funny. Peirce might reply that such 
surveys are not measures of interpretation, but of misinterpretation, since 
the culture finding the speech to be amusing is reacting, in fact, to a different 
interpretant than the one the Western audience reacts to. 3 
But I don't think this argument over conventionality would be one that 
Artaud would take much interest in; for, unlike contemporary critics, 
Artaud would not assume that the Theater of Cruelty, like any other 
theater, has its own conventions which would be difficult for non-Western 
audiences to appreciate. His application of conventionality is confined 
solely to theaters based on written texts, in which the written text 
dominates the method of production, and he would deny that a spectator 
needs any introduction to be drawn into the Balinese spectacles he 
witnessed and by which he was greatly affected. That he felt it necessary to 
write about the Balinese, and not just to adopt their techniques, indicates 
that he recognized the difficulty the Western audience would have in 
understanding these spectacles. But in Artaud's essays this difficulty is 
attributed less to the issue of convention, than it is to the 'blindness' of 
Western audiences. Convention is the crust that has been deposited on the 
senses of Western man by his rational outlook; if the crust is removed, he 
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will have no trouble in seeing reality, as it is presented through gesture, 
speech, and other physical means in the Balinese theater — or in the 
Theater of Cruelty. 
Another way of putting all this is to focus on the issue of danger. 
'Playing it safe', Western society has managed to put distance between 
itself and the object with the intricate structure of dijferances which it 
continually refines and elaborates in all its activities and attitudes. As I 
explained above, Artaud's personal horror of derivation and repetition 
caused him to search for an absolute unity to which he could align 
himself. Yet, at the same time, he recognized the dangerousness of such 
unity, particularly because an individual's experience is shaped by, among 
other things, particular phenomenological attitudes: these things are real 
arid those are not; if you engage in this type of behavior and not that, you 
will be considered insane. Artaud denied that he was insane, but he did 
not deny that he felt divided in his own mind and that the division was a 
painful one. Hence, I find it difficult to agree with Derrida that Artaud felt 
the Theater of Cruelty should be 'playful' in any sense. Derrida seems to 
equate the 'danger' referred to by Artaud with another type of danger that 
he himself writes about, namely the 'play' of meanings in certain texts. 
While I recognize that Derrida does not define 'play' as mere frivolous 
activity, even the issue of marginality does not apply well to Artaud's 
theories. Artaud did not wish to xoafiffiCBssfe^c rational certainty by 
incorporating into meaning an ineradicable element of doubt; that is a 
refinement introduced by Derrida himself. Artaud wants to pull the 
barriers down and rejoin the sign with its object. That he engaged in what 
might be called play with these barriers was, by his own judgment, a mark 
of his failure to finish the job. Whether he even saw his problem in terms 
of the marginality of the sign's identity is not fully established, for in the 
Theater of Cruelty, the identity between sign and object is designed to be 
a necessary one, that is, one determined by the object itself. 
Artaud allows the linguistic sign its various relations to the object, but 
only because it, as the only possible sign of that particular object, has 
been carefully chosen from many possible signs, all but one of which can 
only approximate the object. The 'to be or not to be' speech would fail to 
satisfy Artaud because it relates to an object he does not value. For 
Artaud, there is only one Object in the final analysis, and any sign which 
does not correspond in all its facets to that 'necessity' is dead and useless. 
In the Balinese theater, Artaud says, 
Tout chez eux est ainsi regie, impersonnel; pas un jeu de muscle, pas un roulement 
d'oeil qui ne semble appartenir a une sorte de mathematique reflechie qui mene 
tout et par laquelle tout passe. [...] C'est un theatre qui elimine Tauteur au profit 
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de ce que dans notre jargon occidental du theatre, nous appellerions le metteur en 
scene; mais celcui-ci devient une sorte d'ordonnateur magique, un maitre de 
ceremonies sacrees. Et la matiere sur laquelle il travaille, les themes qu'il fait 
palpiter ne sont pas de lui mais des dieux. lis viennent, semble-t-il, des jonctions 
primitives de la Nature qu'un Esprit double a favorisees. 
Ce qu'il remue c'est le MANIFESTE. (Artaud 1956: Vol. 4, 70, 72) 
In the struggle between man and the higher powers, any sign which is not 
exactly right will fail to persuade those powers, and man will remain 
trapped in a truncated sign-relation. 
Postscript 
I wonder, then, if we have not found tentative agreement between Artaud 
and Peirce on certain key issues. Could we not place the Theater of 
Cruelty, as Artaud envisioned it, on that range of possibilities from 'direct 
perception' to 'indirect perception', albeit at the extreme limits of the 
direct? And as the source which defines all possible signs and interpretants 
of itself, is not the object the controlling element in the Peircean schema of 
representation, as it is in Artaud's? These questions await closer analysis. 
Notes 
1. While a discussion of Artaud in terms other than the icon-index-symbol distinction is 
certainly possible and might produce interesting results (particularly if it focuses on the 
rheme-dicent-argument triad), in this paper I restrict myself to the relation of sign to 
object. 
2. Another topic that needs, unfortunately, more attention than I can give it here is that of 
'mind'. As Joseph Ransdell points out in his article, 'The epistemic function of iconicity 
in perception,' Peirce seems willing to expand the term to an Aristotelian definition of a 
life principle, and this willingness opens some interesting possibilities for comparison 
with the larger sense in which Artaud refers to mind. However, we must keep in mind 
too, that Artaud's use of the term is generally colored by, even at times restricted to, the 
psychological definition. 
3. We might prefer to say, following Ransdell, not the interpretant but the intentional 
object, 'the object as it is in our thought, whether our thought be false or true of the 
object intended, as it really is' (Ransdell 1979: 55). 
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